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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Dustin Thomas Armstrong appeals from the Judgment of Conviction in which the
district court adjudged him guilty of grand theft. In this Reply Brief, Mr. Armstrong seeks
to clarify that the burden of proving that a specific exception to the warrant requirement
is the State's, and asks this Court to decline the State's invitation to also require a
defendant to object to, and disprove, each exception proffered by the State.
Mr. Armstrong also asserts that the District Court properly found that the search was
unreasonable, such that the State's assertion that the constitutionality of the search
should be upheld on alternative grounds lacks merit.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Armstrong's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
1. Should this Court reject the State's invitation to add additional burdens upon a
defendant who has established that evidence was seized during a warrantless
search?
Has the State failed to establish that the Board of Corrections can constitutionally
delegate its duty to other entities?
3. Did the District Court properly find that under the totality of the circumstances,
the search of Mr. Armstrong's vehicle was unreasonable, therefore violating the
constitutional prohibitions of unreasonable searches?
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ARGUMENT
I.
This Court Should Reject The State's Invitation To Add Additional Burdens Upon A
Defendant Who Has Established That Evidence Was Seized During A Warrantless
Search
A.

Introduction
The State has asserted that because "[Mr.] Armstrong did not argue that article

X, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution ipso facto prevented the parole officer from allowing law
enforcement officers from other agencies to act as her agent," Mr. Armstrong failed to
preserve the issue and this Court should not consider it. Mr. Armstrong notes, despite
the State's claims to the contrary, he did object to the admission of the evidence and his
burden of proving that it was discovered during a warrantless search of his vehicle was
met when the State conceded as much. Thereafter, it was the State's burden to prove
an exception to the warrant requirement, including that the police were agents. The
failure of the State to address a necessary prerequisite to establishing agency should
not prevent this Court from addressing the question. Rather, this Court should reject
the State's invitation to add additional burdens upon a defendant which are not
supported by Idaho case law.

B.

This Court Should Reject The State's Invitation To Add Additional Burdens Upon
A Defendant Who Has Established That Evidence Was Seized During A
Warrantless Search
Counsel for Mr. Armstrong objected to the admission of evidence seized in

violation of Mr. Armstrong's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
He moved to suppress "all evidence seized as a result of the detention of the defendant
and subsequent search of his vehicle without a search warrant." (R., p.63.) Counsel
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asserted the waiver contained in the parole agreement "is limited to parole officers ... the
detention of the defendant and the search of his vehicle were done by police officers
rather than parole officers. Furthermore, there were no parole officers on scene when
the search was executed."

Thus, contrary to the State's assertion on

(R., p.66.)

appeal, Mr. Armstrong both objected to the admission of the evidence, and presented
grounds for the objection - the warrantless search of his vehicle.
The State conceded "the police officers did not secure a search warrant in this
case." (R., p.75.) The State asserted that the search "was conducted pursuant to the
administration of Probation/Parole as an exception to the warrant requirement."
(R., p.76.)

The State further raised the claim that police can act as an agent of

probation and parole and conduct a search authorized by a probation and parole officer.
(R., pp. 76-77.) "The search of Defendant's vehicle was authorized by Officer Jeffries,
but carried out by police acting as 'agents' of Probation and Parole." (R., p.76.)
"The burden is on a defendant to show the illegality of a search; however, once
the search is shown to have been made without a warrant, the search is deemed to be
unreasonable per se .... " State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842 (1999). The burden of
proof then rests with the State to demonstrate that the search either fell within a wellrecognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the
circumstances. State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 486 (2004) (citation omitted). When
the State seeks to rely upon the consent exception to the warrant requirement, "The
burden is on the State to show that the consent exception applies." State v. Hansen,
151 Idaho 342, 346 (2011) (citation omitted).
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The

now appears to assert that Mr. Armstrong not only had to object to the

admission

the evidence and establish that the search was a warrantless one, but also

had to object to the exceptions asserted by the State, and disprove them.

(See

Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10 (asserting the issue was not preserved because
Mr. Armstrong failed to more specifically object to the State's assertion of the exception
of consent by agency, and failed to disprove the State's theory by citing article X, § 5).
The cases relied upon by the State do not support this assertion. In Vondenkamp, this
Court declined to address whether a witness should have been excluded from testifying
as a discovery violation sanction. State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 883 (2005).
The Court declined to address the issue because no sanction was ever requested in the
trial court. Id. at 884. In Enyeart, the defendant objected to the lack of foundation for
testimony, thus this Court declined to address the separate question of the testimony's
helpfulness.

State v. Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452, 454 (1993).

In Holland, this Court

declined to address the constitutionality of a seizure when only the search had been
challenged below. State v. Ho/land, 135 Idaho 159, 161 (2000). In none of these cases
has this Court held that a defendant has the burden of objecting to, and disproving,
each of the exceptions to the warrant requirement asserted by the State. Rather, this
Court has clearly stated that the burden to prove an exception to the warrant
requirement is on the State. Anderson, 140 Idaho at 486.
Moreover, unlike the parties in the cases cited by the State, Mr. Armstrong
specifically objected to the admission of the evidence when he filed a motion to
suppress. (R., pp.54, 63.) He also asserted the grounds for the objection asserting that
the search of his car was done without a warrant and in violation of both the Fourth
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Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution. (R., p.63.) Finally, he specifically requested the relevant sanction when
he asked the trial court "for an order suppressing all evidence seized as a result of the
... search of his vehicle without a search warrant." (R., p.63.) Thus, Mr. Armstrong
preserved the issue by meeting all his burdens in the trial court.
As noted above, Mr. Armstrong met his burden of objecting to the admission of
evidence discovered during a warrantless search of his car. The State conceded that
the evidence was found during a warrantless search. Thus, Mr. Armstrong preserved
the only issue he was required to preserve.

The State seeks to apply additional

burdens on Mr. Armstrong, claiming that he also had a burden to object to, and
disprove, each exception raised by the State.

This assertion is not supported by

assignment of burdens of proof clearly articulated in Idaho case law. Thus, this Court
should reject the State's invitation to create additional burdens for the defendant.

11.
The State Has Failed To Establish That The Board Of Corrections Can Constitutionally
Delegate Its Duty To Other Entities
Relying upon two cases which address the contract and tort liability of entities
when a nondelegable duty is breached, the State has asserted that a parole officer can
"enlist the assistance of a police officer to act as her agent in fulfilling her duties."
(Respondent's Brief, p.11.) However, that an entity may continue to maintain liability
when a nondelegable duty is breached does not change the nature of whether that duty
was delegable. Neither of the cases relied upon address the fundamental tenant that,
"Where the sovereign power of the State, meaning the people, have located certain
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authority it must remain." Cooley, A Treatise On The Constitutional Limitations Which
Rest Upon The Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (6 th ed. 1890),
p.137; see also Idaho Const. art. II, § 1 ("The powers of the government of this state are
divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no
person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging
to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of
the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.").
Additionally, the State appears to recognized that legislative authority cannot be
delegated, but does not address or explain why another type of duty specifically placed
upon a particular entity in the constitution could be delegated. (See Respondent's Brief,
p.11.) 1

As noted in the Appellant's Brief, Idaho Case law recognizes that the

constitutional duties and authority of the legislative and judicial branches cannot be
delegated.

(See App. Brief, p.11.)

The State has not provided either argument or

authority to explain why, if this is true of the legislative and judicial branches, it is untrue
of an executive branch entity.
Mr. Armstrong respectfully notes that the State has failed to establish that the
Board of Corrections can delegate its constitutional duty of control, direction, and
management of parole to Idaho's police officers.

As counsel for the State notes, in the Appellant's Brief, the word "legislative" was not
included in a quote from Mellinger v. State Dept. of Corrections, 114 Idaho 494, 499
(Ct. App. 1988). This was done inadvertently and counsel apologizes to the Court for
the err.
1
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111.
The District Court Properly Found That Under The Totality Of The Circumstances, The
Search Of Mr. Armstrong's Vehicle Was Unreasonable, Therefore Violating The
Constitutional Prohibitions Of Unreasonable Searches Such That All Evidence Resulting
From That Search Should Have Been Suppressed

A.

Introduction
The district court found that the search of Mr. Armstrong's car was not

reasonable. (Tr., p.122, Ls.2-8.) In doing so, the court recognized, "[t]he limitation of
the waiver informs the reasonableness of the search in this case." (Tr., p.122, Ls.7-8.)
The State now seeks to have the order denying the motion to suppress affirmed on the
alternative ground that the search was reasonable because "police officers could do
precisely what they did in this case without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment, i.e.,
search the vehicle belonging to Armstrong, who was on parole, without any suspicion
whatsoever." (Respondent's Brief, p.15.) However, the State's assertion simply ignores
the analytical framework clearly articulated in the United States Supreme Court cases it
cites and rests upon a logical leap that the Court literally stated it was not making. A
review of the cases cited by the State reveals that the district court quite rightly
considered the scope of the waiver signed by Mr. Armstrong as a salient factor in
determining whether the search was reasonable, and properly concluded that the
search in this case was unreasonable.
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B.

The District Court Properly Found That Under The Totality Of The
Circumstances, The Search Of Mr. Armstrong's Vehicle Was Unreasonable,
Therefore Violating The Constitutional Prohibitions Of Unreasonable Searches
Such That All Evidence Resulting From That Search Should Have Been
Suppressed
The State initially asserted that the search of Mr. Armstrong's car was both

subject to the consent exception to the warrant requirement and reasonable because,
as a parolee, Mr. Armstrong had a reduced expectation of privacy. (See R., p.76.) In
its initial ruling, granting the motion to suppress, the district court found that the search
was not reasonable. (Tr., p.122, Ls.2-8.) The court recognized that the scope of the
waiver "informs the reasonableness of the search in this case." (Tr., p.122, Ls. 7-8.)
The State did not challenge this finding in either its motion for reconsideration or
memorandum in support. (See R., pp.93-104.)
In determining whether a search of a probationer or parolee violates the Fourth
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the question is
whether the search is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

See, e.g.,

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118
(2001 ). 2 Reasonableness is determined "by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Knights, 534 U.S. at
118-19.

Mr. Armstrong has asserted that the search violated his constitutional rights under
both the 4 th Amendment to the United States Constitution and under Article I, § 17 of the
Idaho constitution. (See App. Brief, pp.13.) He does not, however assert that the
analysis in determining whether a violation occurred is different.
2
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In determining the individual's privacy right, the Court has recognized that a
search condition placed upon a probationer or parolee is a "salient" circumstance.
Knights, 534 U.S. at 118. This is because the conditions placed upon an offender help
to define that individual's privacy interest. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 ("The extent
and reach of these conditions clearly demonstrate that parolees like petitioner have
severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone." (emphasis
added)); Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20 ("The probation condition thus significantly
diminished Knight's reasonable expectation of privacy."). The Court has also found two
other circumstances "salient" to determining the reasonableness of the offender's
expectation of privacy, whether the search condition was "clearly expressed" and
whether the offender was "unambiguously" aware of it.

Samson, 547 U.S. at 852;

Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.
Despite this clearly articulated analytical framework, the State claims that
"[a]lthough Samson involved actions taken pursuant to a statute that permitted
suspicionless searches, the holding of the case stands for the broader proposition that
[suspicionless] searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment." (Respondent's Brief,
p.15.)

Essentially, the State is asserting that the statute at issue in Samson was

irrelevant to its holding. This despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court
specifically stated that: 1) the condition of release ordered, 2) whether it was clearly
expressed, and 3) whether the offender was unambiguously aware of it, were "salient." 3

3

Salient is defined as "jutting out; prominent; conspicuous, most noticeable." Oxford
English Reference Dictionary 2nd ed. 1996.
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Contrary to the State's assertion of a "broader proposition," the holding in
Samson, was actually based upon the specific facts of the case, making its holding

quite narrow.

Based upon Samson's status as a parolee, as well as the extent and

reach of parole conditions clearly expressed in California statutes, which Samson was
unambiguously aware of, the Court found, under a totality of the circumstances,
Samson did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as
legitimate. Samson, 547 U.S. at 852. In doing so, the Court was clear it did not "equate
parolees with prisoners for the purpose of concluding that parolees, like prisoners, have
no Fourth Amendment rights." Samson, 547 U.S. at 850, n.2.
Application of the analysis from Samson to the case at bar reveals that
Mr. Armstrong did have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as
legitimate.

Comparison of the conditions imposed upon Samson and Mr. Armstrong

illuminates the differences in the totality of the circumstances of the cases.
Samson Condition

Armstrong Condition

"[E]very prisoner eligible for release on
state parole 'shall agree in writing to be
subject to search or seizure by a parole
officer or other peace officer at any time of
the day or night, with or without a search
warrant and with or without cause."'
Samson, 547 U.S. at 846 (quoting
Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 3067(a)(2000)).

"Parolee will submit to a search of person
or property, to include residence and
vehicle, at any time and place by any
agent of Field and Community Services
and s/he does waive constitutional right to
be free from such searches."

Initially, the parole condition actually placed upon Mr. Armstrong was not nearly
as broad as that placed upon Samson. While the condition in Samson allowed for a
search by a parole officer or "other peace officer," Mr. Armstrong's condition was limited
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to

of Field and Community Services.

Additionally, the search condition in

clearly expressed that searches could not only be done by a parole officer, but
also by an "other peace officer." Such was not the case with the condition imposed
upon Mr. Armstrong. Rather, the condition limited the search to agents of Field and
Community Services.
Finally, Mr. Armstrong was not "unambiguously aware" that the condition allowed
anyone other than agents of Field and Community Services to search. He understood
the condition to which he agreed to mean "any parole agent under IDOC could search
me or my car or my house." (Tr., p.27, Ls.4-9.) This is a reasonable understanding
since, unlike the condition in Samson, there was no mention of other peace officers.
Based upon the salient facts of this case, Mr. Armstrong had an expectation of
privacy that society would recognize as reasonable, i.e. that he consented to
warrantless searches by parole agents, not all "other peace officers."
This Court must also consider the degree to which the search was needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19. The state
has dual concerns with a parolee. First, rehabilitation, i.e. the hope that the parolee will
successfully complete parole and be integrated back into society. Second, protecting
society from future criminal violations, i.e. concern that a parolee will be more likely to
engage in criminal conduct than an ordinary member of the community. See Knights,
534 U.S. at 119-121 (describing the State's interest in probationers); Samson, 547 U.S.
at 853 (finding same interests with parolees).
The search in this case was not premised upon the State's interest in integrating
Mr. Armstrong back into society. It has been recognized, "For probation authorities to

12

evaluate a probationer's progress in reintegrating into society, the probation officer must
a thorough understanding of the probationer's environment and personal habits."
State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 231 (Ct. App. 1983). This is the basis for allowing

probation officers to visit a probationer's home without a warrant. Id. The same can be
said for parolees and parole officers. That was not, however, true in this case. First,
although the parole officer involved could have gone to the location and at least
observed the search, thereby gaining insight into Mr. Armstrong's environment and
personal habits, she choose not to. (See Tr., p.44, Ls.12-25.) In addition, the parole
officer that authorized the search did not have prior knowledge of Mr. Armstrong and
knew nothing about his progress, save the accusations made by Mr. Armstrong's
mother. (See Tr., p.38, Ls.10-15.) Thus, this search was not conducted to evaluate
Mr. Armstrong's progress in reintegrating into society.
Neither did the officer authorize the search simply based upon the accusations
made by Mr. Armstrong's mother. Instead, it is simply Officer Jefferies' practice to ask
for a search of a car "100 percent of the time when police called with probationers or
parolees." (Tr., p.117, Ls.14-19.) Although Officer Jefferies did state that the report he
was using drugs caused concern about whether Mr. Armstrong was following the terms
and conditions of parole, her basis for authorizing the search was not that narrow.
(Tr., p.38, L.10 - p.39, L.4.) Rather, "pretty much all the time, if I get a phone call that
they've got a parolee or probationer pulled over, I ask for a K9 search of the vehicle."
(Tr., p.39, Ls.1-4.) This is true even if the basis of the stop is running a stop sign.
(Tr., p.42, Ls.16-20.) Subjecting parolees to searches every time they interact with a
police officer doesn't help them integrate into society, rather it continues to set them
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apart and treat them as
foster a resentment of police

than other citizens. One would think such searches would
and authority when the person and his belongings

are being searched not by the person helping to reintegrate them, but rather by police
officers tasked with ferreting out crime.
The search in this case was not designed to, nor did it, advance the State's
interest in integrating Mr. Armstrong into society.
Finally, the State's interest in protecting society from future criminal violations,
i.e., concern that a parolee will be more likely to engage in criminal conduct than an

ordinary member of the community.

The basis of concern in this case was

Mr. Armstrong's mother's report that he had impliedly threatened her by suggesting she
would be dead by the time he turned 39, and she believed he was using
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.31, Ls.1-5, p.114, Ls.5-25.) However, the officers that spoke
to Mr. Armstrong didn't appear to have the same concerns. Those officers weren't
aware of any crime that Mr. Armstrong had committed.

(Tr., p.73, L.24 - p.74, L.2.)

When speaking with the officers Mr. Armstrong was "calm," "easy, laid-back going,"
"polite, very respectful" and cooperative. (Tr., p.59, L.23 - p.60, L.2, p.79, Ls.10-12.)
The officer conducting the K9 search of Mr. Armstrong's car also had reason to question
whether Mr. Armstrong was engaged in criminal conduct. Officer Calley had Officer
Walbey run a K9 search on Mr. Armstrong's car. (Tr., p.89, Ls.1-14.) The dog did not
alert when he was run on the outside of the car. (Tr., p.91, Ls.5-15.) Prior to actually
entering Mr. Armstrong's car, everything the officers had observed served to dispel any
suspicion leveled by Mr. Armstrong's mother, yet the officers continued to extend the
stop and further invade Mr. Armstrong's privacy. This was unreasonable.
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Based upon the totality of the circumstances in this

the district court

properly found that the search of Mr. Armstrong's car by police officers investigating a
"narcotics call" was unreasonable. Thus, the court properly ordered suppression on that
basis.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above argument and authority, as well as that contained in his
Appellant's Brief, Mr. Armstrong respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court's judgment of conviction and reverse the order which denied his motion to
suppress.
DATED this 15th day of September, 201

State Appellate Public Defender
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